

It describes not only various aspects of the process of thinking, but also explains the very need to think critically, and the need of institutions to appreciate and reward people who are able of independent judgment and are resistant to groupthink, instead of firing them for disobedience. People who are skilled critical thinkers are better able to cope with interesting times than those who are not. This book addresses specific need of the intelligence community for improvement of structured analytic methods and prevention of systemic pathologies. The first chapter "How do people reason" explains inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning on the example of false HUMINT from Cuba, which led to intelligence failure during the Cuban missile crisis. The point was that all HUMINT from Cuba was considered false based on previous experience and bias, without checking the evidence. Critical thinking is defined as a deliberate act of reflection of the quality of reasoning, with two equally important goals - to improve the way of reasoning, and to come to a correct conclusion. In the second chapter, Moore presents the Paul and Elder's eight elements of reasoning and intellectual standards. The failure to assess accurately Iraq's alleged WMD program is then attributed to failure of management to encourage analysts to challenge their assumptions. Ideally, intelligence assessments offer choices to decision-making consumers, together with implications of those choices. According to Facione and Giancarlo, disposition to think critically is characterized by seven attributes or habits of mind: truth-seeking, open-mindedness, analyticity, systematic approach, critical thinking, self-confidence, inquisitiveness, and maturity of judgment. Emotions and intuition are essential for motivation of analysts. Chapter three explains lessons learnt from the Cuban missile crisis, where the failure was essentially caused by thousands of falsely positive reports in the past. When the missiles were deployed for real, few people believed that. History proved McCone to be correct, when he argued that the "SA-2s were deployed to Cuba to protect the offensive missile installations". The Soviets capitalized on the idea that it is easier to lead a target astray than to change his mind. Poles of dogmatic tenacity and refutation are discussed to explain confirmation and disconfirmation theory. What prompted the CIA and DIA analysts that this time (Oct 14, 1962, San Cristobal) the reports are true, remains a mystery. Technical information provided by Oleg Penkovsky at that time to both Brits and the Americans about the missiles which were to be deployed at Cuba as SS-4 MRBMs also contributed to the discovery. At this stage, elements of thinking as seen from the point of view of key leaders are also explained, including review of the gains and losses. The bit of information which led to the discovery of submarine base at Cienfuegos in 1970 nicely illustrates the importance of general knowledge about the adversary's preferences. The aerial reconnaissance photographs showed soccer fields intended for recreation of Russian troops. Failure to question assumptions and to take seriously evidence and patterns leads to the same type of errors again and again. As explained on the example of failure to predict Hussein's invasion in Kuwait in 1990, analysts' biases and mindsets are still the most important source of intelligence failures. Truthfulness, observational sensitivity, objectivity, and competence of sources are another aspect which the analysts have to take into account. Sources have legitimate reasons to be untruthful in certain contexts, and not all evidence has the same probative force. Next chapter examines how analysts can be taught to think critically (apart from not being shot at for doing so). Moore's conclusion is that disposition to think critically outside the intelligence community is rarely fostered. The Watson-Glaser critical thinking appraisal used by DIA claims to measure abilities to think critically, including abilities to define problems, recognize stated and unstated assumptions, formulate and select relevant information for the solution of problems, formulate and select relevant and promising hypotheses, draw valid conclusions, and judge validity of interferences. As a previous Director of NSA Air Force Lt Gen Kenneth A Minihan pointed out, "If we do not win the talent war, it does not matter what we invest in infrastructure". To change corporate mindset towards recognition of critical thinkers is by no means easy, even though this change is advantageous both institutionally and personally. Analysts can be wrong for many reasons, but critical approach in assessments prevents these factual inaccuracies from becoming systemic failures. Cooper's scheme of analytic pathologies then explains in detail why intelligence failures are more likely to occur in institutions with specific mindset, including performance measurements. Unless emotion, observation, intuition, and critical thinking are based on broad background knowledge, all the pieces are unlikely to fit together. To avoid confirmation bias, alternatives have to be considered in the analytical process. And the last, maybe the most interesting part, is an Appendix with NSA's critical thinking and structured analysis class syllabus. 0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. Best Seller for Intelligence Analysis By Thurston This book is a favorite among intelligence practitioners because it makes the case for including critical thinking practices in intelligence analysis. It is also available to download for free at [...]

NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT-- OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price Author David Moore makes a powerful argument that analysts who possess critical thinking skills are better able to cope with the complexities of a post-Cold War world than those who are not. Although technology can assist analysts by cataloguing and presenting data, information and evidence in new ways, it cannot do the analysis for them. To be most effective, analysts need an overarching, reflective framework to add structured reasoning to sound, intuitive thinking. Critical thinking provides such a framework and goes further, positively influencing the entire intelligence analysis process. This paper defines critical thinking in the context of intelligence analysis, explains how it influences the entire intelligence process, explores how it toughens the art of intelligence analysis, suggests how it

may be taught, and deduces how analysts can be persuaded to adopt this habit. Related products: Crafting an Intelligence Community: Papers of the First Four DCIs (Book and DVD) is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00298-8> Sensemaking: A Structure for an Intelligence Revolution (2012) is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-000-01062-5A> A Life in Intelligence: The Richard Helms Collection (Book and DVD) can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/041-015-00292-9> Who Watches the Watchmen?: The Conflict between National Security and Freedom of the Press is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-020-01606-3> The FBI Story 2015 is available here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/027-001-00102-1> Intelligence Espionage resources collection can be found here: <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/catalog/security-defense-law-enforcement/intelligence-espionage>

About the Author/Agency/Author Bio: David T. Moore is a career senior intelligence analyst and technical director at the National Security Agency. Moore is an adjunct faculty member of the National Cryptologic School and has taught at the National Defense Intelligence College, and Trinity University, both in Washington, DC. Mr. Moore holds a B.A. in sociology from Washington and Lee University and a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence College. He is the author of numerous publications on intelligence. Moore's expertise in intelligence analysis competencies, methods, and standards was developed over two decades of intelligence assignments, both in Washington, DC area and abroad. This publication builds on six years of advocacy for, and mentoring of, best practices in intelligence.